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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1977

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Go World News

Kato Becomes 9th Honinbo

In the 5th game of the 32nd Honinbo Title match, Kato Masao defeated Takemiya Masaki by resignation and thus won the Honinbo Title by a convincing 4-1 margin. Kato played riskily in the final game, but a strangely faltering Takemiya was unable to make the most of his opportunities. This gives Kato his third title (the others are Judan and Gosei) and so far his most important one. He has assumed the title of Honinbo Kensei and is the 9th under the modern tournament system.

Ishida Yoshio, however, predicts that Kato will soon fall into a slump. The reason is that Kato got married on the 25th September, to Sasaki Izumi, the daughter of a famous calligraphy teacher, Sasaki Tainan. Ishida's reason for making the prediction is that both he and Takemiya fell into slumps after getting married. From Kato's point of view, Ishida is probably just indulging in wishful thinking.



Kato becomes Honinbo Kensei—making his acceptance speech.

Rin Challenges Otake Meijin

On the 11th August Rin Kaiho defeated Kato Honinbo in the final round of the 2nd (Asahi) Meijin league, thus winning the league with a 7-1 score and earning the right to challenge Otake Hideo for the Meijin title. If Rin had lost to Kato, there would have been a three-way tie for first place among Rin, Ishida and Kato. Formerly there was no playoff in the Meijin league and the higher ranked player took precedence, but the rule has now been amended so that there is a playoff between the top two ranked players in the case of a tie. This means that Kato was out of it even if he won, but Ishida still had a chance. However, Rin managed to avoid complications by winning outright.

Rin and Otake are the same age (both were born in May 1942) and over a decade ago Go journalists predicted the imminent advent of the 'Rin—Otake age' in which the two would dominate tournament Go. However, success came earlier to Rin, beginning with his victory over Sakata in the 4th Meijin title in 1965, and Otake remained in his shadow during the 1960's. Rin also won the 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, 11th and 12th Meijin titles and also held the Honinbo title from 1968 to 1970. Otake did not really come into his own until 1975, when he won the Meijin title from Ishida. This was the 14th and last Yomiuri Meijin title. The following year, sponsorship switched to the Asahi newspaper which renumbered the series. In the 1st Asahi Meijin title match, Otake solidified his reputation by rebuffing the challenge of Ishida.

The 2nd Meijin title is the first title match between the two. Rin is perhaps a slight favourite, for his results so far this year have been excellent, while Otake has been in indifferent form.

Results to date:

Game 1 (Sept. 8, 9). Rin (W) won by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.
Game 2 (Sept. 19, 20). Rin won by resignation.

Rin Dominates 2nd Kisei Title

The mammoth Kisei title (Yomiuri) has been progressing steadily throughout the year and so far the star has been Rin Kaiho 9-dan. First of



Rin Kaiho facing his most dangerous opponent in the final round of the Meijin league.

1977 Meijin League

	I	R	S	H	Ku.	Kaj.	Kat.	S	C	Score	Place
1. Ishida	—	×	○	○	○	○	×	○	○	6 — 2	2
2. Rin	○	—	×	○	○	○	○	○	○	7 — 1	1
3. Sakata	×	○	—	○	×	○	×	○	○	5 — 3	3
4. Hashimoto	×	×	×	—	○	○	○	○	×	4 — 4	5
5. Kubouchi	×	×	○	×	—	×	○	×	×	2 — 6	—
5. Kajiwara	×	×	×	×	○	—	×	○	○	3 — 5	6
7. Kato	○	×	○	×	×	○	—	○	○	5 — 3	4
7. Shiraishi	×	×	×	×	○	×	×	—	×	1 — 7	—
7. Cho	×	×	×	○	○	×	×	○	—	3 — 5	—

The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

all, he won the 9-dan section in the first stage, then also won the second stage, which consists of a knockout tournament among the winners of each dan section.

The third stage of the tournament is yet

another knockout tournament, the winner of which will challenge Fujisawa Shuko, holder of the Kisei title. The top title-holders of the year are automatically seeded in this tournament, so they do not participate in the first two stages.

They are joined by the winner of the second stage and three other players recommended by a committee. This year the three were the next three place-getters in the second stage.

The final nine:

Hashimoto Uтарo: finalist in 1st title

Otake: Meijin

Kato: Honinbo and Judan

Kobayashi Koichi: Tengen

Takemiya: Honinbo till June

Rin: 1st, all-dan playoff

Kubouchi: 2nd, all-dan playoff

Kudo: 3rd, all-dan playoff

Honda: 3rd, „ „ „

(Hashimoto, Kubouchi and Honda are all from the Kansai Ki-in).

1977 European Go Congress

The 21st European Go Congress was held at Rijswijk in Holland from July 23rd to August 6th. The European Championship was won by a dark horse, Wolfgang Isele, 4-dan, of West Germany, with 9 points out of a possible 10. Mr. Isele receives the JAL prize of a return air ticket to Japan. Second place was taken by H. Hasibeder of Austria (8½ points), third by Ronald Schlemper of Holland (8) and fourth by M. Macfadyen of England (6). V. Astashkin, the first player from Russia to enter this tournament, finished equal sixth with 4 points.

Division One of the main tournament was won by J. Hubert, 2-dan of France, with 7 points out of 9, while second place with 6 points was shared by Beck of Austria, Dowsey of England, and Hungerink of Holland.

This year the Nihon Ki-in was represented at the Congress by Kano 9-dan and Nakaoka 7-dan, who led a group of Japanese amateur players on a goodwill tour to Europe.

London Open Go Congress 1978

The fourth London Open Go Congress will be held from Friday December 30th, 1977, to Monday January 2nd, 1978 at the London Go Centre. This tournament is well established as the biggest and strongest tournament in the European Go calendar and should attract well over 100 entrants.

Contact: 18 Lambolle Place, London NW3 4RG.

Go Summer Camp 1978.

The Gothenborg Go Club in Sweden is organizing a holiday camp which will combine Go playing, tuition and tournaments with such summer activities as swimming, sailing and viewing the seal colonies. The camp will be from June 26th to July 2nd at the Ekenäs Skärgårdshotel on Koster, the westernmost island of Sweden. This island is an established holiday resort known for its beautiful scenery and is about 45 minutes by boat from the city of Stromstad. The cost will be about £150 for the whole week, food included. You are encouraged to bring your family. Children under 13 stay free if they sleep with their parents and pay only half price for food. Children under 4 receive free food.

Registration should be made as soon as possible, as it is on a first come first served basis.

Please send £30 or 200 Sw. kr. for registration to:

Gothenburg Go Club

Christer Lindstedt

Landalagången 2

411 30 Göteborg

Sweden

Complete details will then be forwarded to you.

Michael Redmond Becomes an Insei

In September this year, Michael Redmond, aged 14, of Santa Barbara, California, was accepted by the Nihon Ki-in as an insei or professional pupil. Michael made his second trip to Japan this summer to study Go for two months and showed so much promise that he was encouraged to stay on for a year of intensive training. When Michael made his first trip to Japan, in summer last year, he had reached 3-dan after playing for three years. When he returned this year, he had improved to about 5-dan strength. Fourteen is quite an advanced age at which to become an insei in Japanese terms, but Michael is the youngest Westerner to reach this level and Iwamoto 9-dan is quite confident in his potential. Michael started out ranked number nineteen among over forty insei. He joins the other Westerner training as an insei, James Kerwin, also of the U.S., who is in 10th place at the moment.

Kobayashi Koichi Wins Another Title

Kobayashi Koichi, current holder of the Tengen title, has been a perennial winner of the minor tournaments restricted to player of 7-dan rank and lower. In July this year he won his second Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title in a row. This time he defeated his arch-rival Cho Chikun 7-dan 2-0 in the playoff. Kobayashi has dominated this title since its founding last year by the Akahata (Red Flag) newspaper and has compiled a perfect 14-0 record. Much to the relief of his rivals, however, Kobayashi will now have to rest on his laurels, for he gained promotion to 8-dan in the 1977 spring rating tournament and is thus no longer eligible for the minor tournaments. The title games will be presented in the next issue.

Seminar for Overseas Go Instructors

From the 7th to the 17th November this year, the Nihon Ki-in, with the support of the Expo

Association, is holding the 1st Go Seminar for Overseas Instructors. Representatives from 8 western European countries are being invited to Japan for ten days of intensive instruction in teaching methods and advanced technical aspects of Go.

In recent years the Nihon Ki-in has regularly despatched teams of professionals on instruction tours of nearly all countries where Go has gained a foothold, but this is the first time since the two international tournaments of 1963 and 1964 that a group of western players has been invited to Japan.

The representatives were selected by their national Go associations and the main criterion was that they should be actively engaged in the propagation of Go in their own countries. It is hoped that raising the level of expertise of Go instructors will even further stimulate the expansion of Go outside Japan.



Another title for Kobayashi Tengen (left)—Shinjin-O Title, second game.

Second Gosei Title: Game Three

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kato Masao

Komi: 5½

Date: 30th May, 1977

Time: 5 hours each




Figure 1 (1-25)


Figure 1 (1-25)

White 4. Takemiya thought about this move for 32 minutes, which shows how seriously he took this game. For a change, Kato played the low Chinese fuseki move at 5. The position after the bottom left corner exchange is almost the same as the fuseki of the second Judan game (see *Go World* No. 2).

Black 25 was generally considered a dubious move and after the game Kato agreed. The reason becomes clear in Figure 2. Apparently, the patient moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* are preferable.

Figure 2 (26-52)

Whatever extension Black makes after White 26 and 28, blocking at 38 will work perfectly for White. This is



Dia. 1





Figure 2 (26-52)

why 25 was bad. Since he has no good move on the side, Black switches to the invasion at 29.

White 38 is still an excellent point. When Black answers at 39, White has another nice move at 40. The game is developing nicely for Takemiya.

White 42. If White gets carried away and keeps attacking with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, Black counterattacks with 4 and 6, which is bad for White.

White 50. Takemiya thought about



this move for 57 minutes. Attacking with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* is more aggressive, but White's bottom moyo is then spread too thinly. 50 and 52 are more solid.






Figure 3 (53-76)
63 : connects

Figure 3 (53-76)

The drawback of playing defensively with 50 and 52 is that Black gets the chance to make the severe attacking move at 53. If White hanes underneath at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black plays 2 to 12, whereupon White has to worry about the cutting point at *a*. If he defends it, White switches to an invasion at the bottom. Takemiya commented after the game that he also considered drawing back at 5 in *Dia. 5*. White




gets more profit than in *Dia. 4*, but Black squeezes in sente up to 18, so this variation is also unfavourable for White. Black 10 at 11 is bad, of course, because of White 10, Black *a*, White *b*.

White 54 at *a* is not satisfactory either, as Black plays *b*, so 54 seems to be the only move.


White 56. This manoeuvre does not work out well, as it only helps Black to solidify his territory. However, in the post-game discussion the players could not find a good continuation for White, which shows how good a move 53 is.

White 58. If White pushes at 1 in *Dia. 6* first, Black answers 3 at 4. If White plays 60 at 68, Black takes sente with Black 61, White *b*, Black 69, White *c*, then invades at the bottom.



White thus seems to have little alternative to the game sequence to 68, but this entails a large territorial loss, so 69 is good enough for Black.


Haruyama 7-dan suggested playing 60 at 1 in *Dia. 7*. White patiently puts up with making bad shape here in order to capture two stones with 3 to 7. However, in a position in which



Dia. 7

White has based his whole strategy upon attack, being satisfied with taking profit in gote would be psychologically impossible. Takemiya preferred to stake everything upon continuing his attack and so resolutely pushed along the fifth line with 70 and 72.


White 74. A week-kneed move which Takemiya felt was the primary cause of his defeat. Forcing once more with 1 in *Dia. 8*, then striking at the vital point of 3, is much more severe. The players examined this variation for nearly an hour after the game and came to the conclusion that Black 4 is the best



Dia. 8

answer. Black can look after his centre group, but White gets sente to make the reinforcement at 19. This would make it a close game. Black can no longer invade at the bottom as the centre has been strengthened, so the game becomes a contest in surrounding area.

Once Black defends at 75, there is no good way for White to attack this group. The fact that White's centre position has not been reinforced means that even if White adds a move at 1 in *Dia. 9*, Black can still invade with 2 etc. and get a ko. However, making a



Dia. 9

smaller-scale defensive move at the bottom is not worth it. In view of this, White 76, forestalling Black's more or less sente cut at *d*, is the biggest point on the board.





Figure 4 (77-100)

Figure 4 (77-100)


Black 77. A decisive move which Black has been aiming at for some

time. If White blocks on the outside at 1 in *Dia. 10*, Black lives easily with 2 and 4.




Dia. 10

Black plunges in further with 79, but in the opinion of Kobayashi Koichi, 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* are good enough. If White 2 at *a*, Black plays *b*, while if White 2 at *c*, Black *a* is good enough. The sequence in *Dia. 11*, however, gives White the option of choosing the continuation, while 79 in the Figure is an aggressive move which aims at settling the shape.




Dia. 11




Dia. 12

White 84. If at 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black connects under with 2. When he hanes at 4, White cannot block his path because of all the cutting points in his position. White's toughest move seems at first glance to be 1 in *Dia. 13*. When Black cuts at 2, White plays 3, aiming at a capturing race. However, Black extends his liberties with 4 and 6, then plays 8. This makes miai of 10 and the combination Black *a*–White *b*–Black *c*, so White collapses. Instead of 8, Black could also extend at 1 in *Dia. 14*.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

If White 2, pushing through with 3 etc. is clearly sufficient to secure victory.

The sequence in the Figure seems to be the best answer to Black's invasion. White takes sente, then pins all his hopes on his own invasion at 100. However, Black has clearly taken the lead—he has gouged out a large area of White's moyo and has solidified his own corner. From this point on, Black just tries to wind up the game as quickly as possible.





Figure 5 (101-126)

Figure 5 (101–126)

Black cannot hope to catch White's invasion stone. He is ahead in area, so his only worry is his large centre group. Unfortunately for White, there is no good way to attack it. If White *a*, for example, Black answers with *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, White *e*. Black then blocks at *f*, making miai of *g* and 26 and lives easily.

White 22. At first the players following the game thought that Black had gone wrong, but Kobayashi Koichi pointed out the sequence in *Dia. 15*.



Black could play either 11 or 13 at *a* instead, but in any case this is a difficult variation which could bring the game to a premature conclusion. Kato chose not to play this way. Instead he coolly defended at 25, forcing White to defend at 26, as he realized that this was sufficient to win. Exchanging 21 for 22 lessens the value of Black *h*, but playing 25 in sente compensates for this.

Figure 6 (127–173)

Black 31–35. This combination is the last large endgame point. 36 and 39 are miai.

Black 49 at *a* does not work. After White *b*, Black *c*, White answers at *d*, White 70. If Black carelessly answers at 1 in *Dia. 16*, he loses sente because







Figure 6 (127–173)



he must defend against White *a* which threatens to set up a ko. However, if he ignores 70 altogether, he can answer 1 in *Dia. 17* with 2 etc. White 1 in *Dia. 18* does not work either.

Figure 7 (174–200)

Figure 8 (201–260)

White gets a ko with 74, but it has little bearing on the result, as Kato already has the game tied up.

Black wins by 5½ points.




Figure 7 (174-200)
ko : 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 100




Figure 8 (201-260)
6 : ko (at 3), 22 : ko (at 16), 24 : connects (at 3), 56 : connects (at 19), 60 : connects (above 8)

32nd Honinbo Title

Game Two




Figure 1 (1-34)

White: Kato Masao
Black: Takemiya Masaki
Komi: 5½
Date: 23rd, 24th May, 1977

Figure 1 (1-34)


In the days of the Ishida-Rin contests, nearly every game seemed to feature the large avalanche joseki. Nowadays, it's the turn of the Chinese fuseki pattern. Kato is addicted to it, perhaps for good reason, but Takemiya is also fond of it. Here he tries the low move at 5.

The pattern from 12 to 21 is frequently seen with the Chinese fuseki. The reason is that if White answers

11 at 27, Black plays 12 himself, as this point would combine nicely with his right side position.

White 22. White exchanges this move for Black 23 because if he plays 24 immediately, Black can make an excellent checking extension at 22.

Black 27. Takemiya regretted making this move, as he felt that it was too heavy. He commented that 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* are preferable. If White plays 4 and 6, Black can switch to the capping play at *a* in the Figure. Incidentally, this



Dia. 1

position came up in a non-tournament demonstration game between Rin and Otake two days before this match. Rin played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* and Otake continued with 4 at *a*.

Kato's invasion at 34 took Takemiya completely by surprise. Perhaps he had expected the more conventional move at *b*.

Figure 2 (35-61)

Black 35 seemed to show impressive fighting spirit, but Takemiya also regretted this move, as on reflection he concluded that the commonplace jump at 1 in *Dia. 2* was better. If White 2, the moves to 7 are likely. If White 4 at 5, Black 4 is an excellent move.






Figure 2 (35-61)




Dia. 2

White 36 is the only move. White 1 in *Dia. 3* is an overplay, as Black has the severe combination of 2 and 4. White is hard put to find a good continuation.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Takemiya commented that he was grateful for White 38. Apparently the combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* is

better for White. The continuation to 14 is pretty well forced. White sacrifices two stones but gets a solid position and can still aim at the points *a* and *b*.

White 48. Kato spent no time on this move, but it turned out to be one of the key points of the game, as it left Black with the option of starting a ko by cutting at *b*. Judging by the result, it seems that simply descending at *b* would have been better. However, it goes against the grain to play a move which shows such poor fighting spirit.

Black 51. Necessary to prevent White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*.



Dia. 5

Takemiya felt moderately satisfied with the result to 61. The central thickness obtained with 57 to 61 is of some assistance in the formation of a moyo on the right side. In addition, he has the threat of Black *b*. The possibility of this ko is constantly on the minds of both players throughout the game.

Figure 3 (62–91)

White 62 is an important invasion. In answering at 63, Black's aim is to build central thickness. The sequence to 74 can be regarded as a middle game joseki.

Black 75 etc. epitomize the Takemiya style—the aim of these moves is to utilize Black's thickness below by en-





Figure 3 (62–91)

closing the centre on a large scale. Instead of 77, Takemiya also considered the simple move at *a*, which does not help White to solidify his area at the top, but he could not decide which was better. For 81, another possibility is 1 in *Dia. 6*, followed by the extension at 3.



Dia. 6

White 84. This is the crucial stage of the middle game. White has to come in before Black closes off the centre, but the question is how far. Takemiya felt that 84 should have been played one space to the left, at *b*. The reason is that Black's shoulder-hit at 91 works perfectly, while the best answer Black has to *b* is blocking at *c*. This would make quite a difference to the size of Black's centre.

Figure 4 (92–122)

Since Black has blocked off the





Figure 4 (92-122)

centre, White must go for territory at the bottom. White 94, forestalling Black *a*, is a very big move.

White 102. Kato's sealed move at the end of the first day. This is fast progress for a two-day game.

Black 103. Takemiya regretted this move, commenting later that this was his chance to push through and cut with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. Connecting at 4 is out of the question, as Black can get life with the sequence to 17. Consequently, White has to play 4 at 11, but then Black can cut at 4. The effect of such a cut is to help Black with the endgame play in this corner.



Dia. 7
12 : connects

Takemiya first realized that he had let slip this important opportunity when Kato crawled at 16. Even now, simply blocking at *b* was still a good move, but fighting spirit impelled




Figure 5 (122-145)


Takemiya to attack at 17 instead.

White 22. A nice endgame tesuji.

Figure 5 (122-145)


The whole sequence from 22 seems to gain White a point compared to the ordinary sequence White 34, Black 25, White *a*. Moreover, the cut at 32 is valuable, as it eliminates Black's ko threats at *b* etc.

White 36. This turned out to be the losing move. White should have followed *Dia. 8*. If Black 2, White must defend at 3. The continuations are extremely difficult and the players spent over two hours after the game examining them. They finally came to the conclusion that this would have led to a half point decision.




Dia. 8

Black 37. A natural move, perhaps, but still an excellent counterattack.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

If instead Black cuts at 1 in *Dia. 9*, he suffers a considerable loss in the result to 8. Connecting at 1 in *Dia. 10* is not good either. The sequence to 6 reveals Black 1 to be a very submissive answer to $\triangle$.

White can hardly change horses in midstream, so he continues by cutting at 38.

Figure 6 (146–163)

Black plays 47 to 51 so that he can squeeze White from the inside here later, then switches to 53, swallowing up this white group. It is too late for White to save it. If 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, White is foiled by Black 4 to 8. Even the atari at *a* does not get White an eye. Note also that 53 decreases the burden on Black of the ko started later on. The exchange in this Figure seems to have settled the game in Black's favour.

White 54 and 56 threaten the large endgame tesuji at *a*, but Black does not






Figure 6 (146–163)



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

10 : connects

have the patience to defend at *b*. Instead, he starts the ko at 57 with the intention of winding up the game.

Black 59 is a good move. White has to answer at 60, as Black is threatening to play the sequence in *Dia. 12*.

Figure 7 (164–199)

The ko continues, but White's prospects are not good. The very fact





Figure 7 (164-199)
ko : 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86

that he compromises and connects at 72 is a sign of this.


Black has no end of ko threats, so White finally dissolves the ko with 94. However, this was probably just Kato's way of resigning, as he has no adequate counter to 95. If White 96 at 1 in *Dia. 13*, Black has good moves at 10 and 12. Capturing two stones with 18 is apparently good enough for Black to win.



Dia. 13
16 : ko ; 18 : takes 2 stones

Kato resigned after Black 99. If White 1 in *Dia. 14*, Black plays 2, and if either White 3 or *a*, he cannot answer 6 at *b*.

This was an important victory for Takemiya and must have gone some way towards restoring his confidence. After all, not many players can claim to have treated Kato like this in recent months.



Dia. 14

(Time used. White: 8 hours 22 mins.
Black: 8 hours 1 min.)

(Adapted from the July 1977 *Kido*)

Game Three

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kato Masao

Komi: 5½

Date: 8th, 9th June, 1977





Figure 1 (1-34)

Figure 1 (1-34). *Open to criticism*

The revised Chinese-style fuseki again—this pattern often leads to the early fighting that Kato is fond of.

Black 13 is an unusual move. Simply extending at 1 in *Dia. 1* is too submissive and the gap between 1 and ▲ is too narrow. The usual move is the hane at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White answers




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

at *a*, defending at *b* is good for Black, so White attaches at 2 and crosscuts. The sequence to 9, in which Black gets thickness, is often seen in the Chinese-style fuseki.

White 16 is a light move, but the heavy move of 17, played to prevent White *a*, is questionable. Kato's comment: cutting at 1 in *Dia. 3* is the only move. White 4 at *a* is bad, as Black attaches at *b*, so White slips under at 4. However, the thickness built by the ponnuki at 3 makes this result favourable for Black.




Dia. 3

The result to 23 can be evaluated as an early success for White. Black 23 cannot be omitted because of White *b*, Black *c*, White *d*.

Black 25 also came in for self-criticism. Kato: this is overdoing things. Following the ordinary pattern of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* is better. If White 4, Black jumps to 5 and has no worries. (In *Igo Club*, Cho Chikun recommended the same variation, but instead of 5, suggested Black *a*, White *b*, Black *c*.)

White 26-34. The profit that White



Dia. 4

takes here seems to give him the overall advantage. Once again, Takemiya has shown that the fuseki is his forte.





Figure 2 (35-51)


Figure 2 (35-51). *Promising for White*

Black 35, 37. Kato regretted these as vulgar moves and wished that instead of 35 he has played the light move of 1 in *Dia. 5*. This leaves him with the option of attaching at 3 later.



Dia. 5

2 : elsewhere




Dia. 6

White 40 is the key point for influence. Permitting Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* would be unbearable.

One may wonder if Black 41 is necessary, but imagine the effect of a white move here. At one blow it would cause Black's moyo to shrivel up, while expanding White's position and securing his group from attack. Black cannot afford not to occupy this key point, but seeing White take the superb fuseki point of 42 is discouraging. At this rate, it seems unlikely that Black will be able to give the komi.

When Black approaches at 45, White naturally attaches on top at 46 in order to build up his moyo. Black then goes into the corner at 47. If Black enters the corner immediately by playing 45 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, the sequence to 12 follows. It should be obvious that the game procedure gives Black a better result, as he has the threat of the hane at *a*.



13 : connects *Dia. 7*

Figure 3 (52-81). *A desperate invasion*

White 52 is another excellent point. The position allows Black no room for optimism. In response, Kato comes up with 53, a move with three objectives: expanding Black's moyo, limiting White's moyo, and preparing the way





Figure 3 (52-81)




Dia. 8

for Black *a*. Playing the hane at *a* immediately is not good. White answers with 2, 4 and 6 in *Dia. 8*, thus expanding his moyo with Black's assistance. Moreover, Black is still open at the top at *a*, so he can hardly hope to gain more than ten points here.

White 54, defending against Black *a*, is the only move. The sequence to 64 is forced, but White is enclosing on a larger scale than Black.

Black 67. Black would like to extend at 74, but then White defends at 73, making it very difficult for Black to do anything on the left. For better or for worse, Kato believed that he had no choice but to invade at 67.

White 76 is the key point for depriving Black of eye-shape. If White omits this move, Black gets eyes easily by



Dia. 9

attaching at 1 in *Dia.* 9.





Figure 4 (82-104)
ko: 101, 104


Figure 4 (82–104). *A do-or-die move*

In view of the fact that Black ignores 84, it seems that White *a* would have been better than 82. If White cuts at 1 in *Dia. 10*, Black gives up his corner stones in the sequence to 8.



Dia. 10


The purpose of Black 85 is of course to strengthen Black's group on the left, but that is not all. Black's secret aim is to attack White's group on the right



Dia. 11


with the combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*. White must reinforce his group, but playing at *b* would be more effective than 86. White *b* would also be more useful in attacking Black later.

White begins his attack with the peep at 88. The moves to 93 are natural, but White 94 is bad. In fact, it turned out to be the losing move. White should either simply block at *c* or he should force with 1 in *Dia. 12*, then push at 3. The presence of a white stone at 1 would make a big difference in the later fighting here.




Dia. 12


Black 95 is a do-or-die move which Black has been aiming at for some time. White has no choice but to start a large ko with 96. If he compromises with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 13*, he is reduced to the bare minimum eye-space, while Black is left with the option of capturing two stones with *a*. This would be unendurable.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15





Shimamura 9-dan, the official referee, watches intently as Takemiya ponders his missed opportunities.





Figure 6 (138-200)

Figure 6 (138-200). *The last missed opportunity.*




Dia. 16

White 38 is a big move, but pushing into Black's moyo with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16* is bigger. This way Black's lead would not be so clear-cut and White might have an outside chance of winning. Securing his centre with 39 to 49, then jumping to 61, wrap up the game for Black.

White 88. A good move which forces Black 89.

Black 95. If Black makes the normal endgame move of 1 in *Dia. 17*, White gets six points in the corner with 2 and 4.



White 98. The safe way to answer is with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 18*. However, White ends up with one point less than in *Dia. 17*, which is painful. White is losing anyway, but giving up this extra point is more than he can stand, so he resists with 98. However, this leads to a ko.





Figure 7 (201-239)
ko : 23

Figure 7 (201-239). *White goes out fighting.*

White 116. If at 1 in *Dia. 19*, White can get a seki. White prefers to keep on fighting to the bitter end, but the exchange of the top right corner for the bottom centre is unfavourable for



Dia. 19

him, so the gap widens.

The game finally ended at 8.51 p.m. White had used 8 hours 59 minutes and Black 8 hours 4 minutes. This was a very painful defeat for Takemiya, precisely because he had played so well in the first half of the game. Losing when one should have won is more painful than losing when one has been completely outplayed.

Black wins by 7 points.

(Adapted from a commentary by Kato in the August *Kido*)

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Takemiya Masaki

date: 15th, 16th June, 1977





Figure 1 (1-24)

Figure 1 (1-24). *A different fuseki*

This is the only game of the eight played between Kato and Takemiya in

the Gosei and Honinbo title matches which does not feature the Chinese-style fuseki. However, Takemiya adopts the sanren-sei (three starpoints in a row) pattern, which is perhaps the closest to the Chinese-style of the older fuseki patterns.

White 10. One could also consider the close-up pincer at 1 in *Dia. 1*.



Dia. 1

After the joseki to 8, White approaches at 9, whereupon Black will probably attack at 10 (*a* is insipid), then play 12. Kato felt that this let Black dictate the pace of the game, so he played 10 in the game. However, both sides are satisfied with the sequence to 22.

Black 23 is an excellent point. Takemiya comments that he also considered *a*.

White 24. His best “guess”, according to Kato. If White *b* instead, Black has a good move at *c*.

Figure 2 (25–54). *Losing a move*

Now is the best time to invade at 25. If Black plays *a* first, White answers at *b*, making it much more difficult to invade.

When White attaches at 26, Black






Figure 2 (25–54)



Dia. 2


dodges the attack with 27. If he simply extends to 2 in *Dia. 2*, he is in for a hard time when White attacks at 3.

White 28 is a vital point, but White could also play out with a hane at 1 in *Dia. 3*. If Black 2, White plays 3 and 5 and the sequence to 17 is forced. White could be satisfied with this result because he is not left with the cutting points created in his shape in the game.




Dia. 3

Black 35 is a mistake. Takemiya assumed that White would answer at *c*, but instead he attacks strongly at 36. This would usually be a bad move, as White is peeping at a bamboo-joint, but here it works well. Black should have exchanged 1 in *Dia. 4* for White 2 before descending at 3. Black gets sente in the sequence to 10, so he retains the advantage of having had the first move. In the game sequence, he virtually falls one move behind.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

White 38 is careless. Capturing a stone with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5* seems to be better, as the result to 7 is reasonable for White. He is left with sente moves at *a*, *b* and *c*, so Black does not get much territory. If Black cuts at *d*, White resists with *e*. However, White is not too upset about his slip with 38, as Black is still forced to live in gote.

Playing 44 at *d* in an attempt to capture Black would not be advisable. Black would counterattack by attaching at *e*, thus threatening to set 27 in motion. Note also that if White attacks with 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black answers at 2 and gets a seki. It is better not to settle the shape, thus keeping open the option of playing endgame moves at *a*, *b* or *c*.

White 52 is bad—White should simply jump out at 54. Black will then continue in the same way as in the



Dia. 6

game, so White can look forward to taking profit later by descending at *f*. The exchange of 52 for 53 is awful for White.

In the forced sequence from 55 to 64, White succeeds in confining Black to the side. As much as he wants to,





Figure 3 (55-85)

there is no way for Black to force his way to the centre. If he jumps out to 1 in *Dia. 7*, he has to come back and defend at 7, so White plays 8 or *a*. All the same, securing his group with 65 gives Black a big lead in territory. The outcome of the game will hinge on how big a centre White gets.

White 66 is too ambitious—White should content himself with the nar-




rower move at *a*, which would make it harder for Black to try anything inside White's moyo. Setting Black's single stone in motion with 67 is a natural response to White 66.


Black 71. An unbelievable change in direction, according to Kato, who could not understand why Takemiya did not push once more at 72, forcing White *b*. Kato felt that turning at the vital point of 72 helped improve his position.

White 78,80. This is the kind of blunt and ferocious attack, on the surface defying the conventional wisdom of professional Go, that only Kato can come up with. Otake Meijin commented that he could not believe his eyes.


Black cannot capture White 84. Even though Black *a* in *Dia. 8* is sente, Black 1 does not work, as $\triangle$ is a ladder block. Playing 81 at 1 in *Dia. 9* does not help, as Black is still in trouble



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

after White 2 and 4.

Black 85. Black is relying on this peep to rescue his group. If White 1 in *Dia. 10*, Black attaches at 2, aiming next at either Black *a* or the combination Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d* (threatening a geta with *e*). If White plays 1 at 2 to stop Black from getting eye-shape, Black answers with *f*, making miai of *g* and *h*.

Figure 4 (85-115). Dodging the attack

White 86. This move aims at preventing Black from causing any trouble here, but Kato commented after the game that he should have resisted Black 85 more vigorously. The strongest move is White 1 in *Dia. 11*. The sequence to 13, in which White takes the centre, can be hypothesized. This





Figure 4 (85-115)




Dia. 11

is better for White than the game sequence to 93, in which Black discards the centre but captures two stones. This result is unsatisfactory for White.

Black 97, 99. Takemiya obviously believes that he cannot give up these stones. At this stage Black has a slight lead but the situation is delicate.

Black 101 is a very slack move, presumably played from concern about the centre stones. However, there is nothing wrong with answering White 100 with 1 in *Dia. 12*. If White 3, Black 4 is good enough. White forces



Dia. 12

with 5, then engineers a swap with 7 and 9, but the area Black gets on the side preserves his lead.

Black goes all out to enclose the corner with 7 and 9, but his centre stones are still a burden to him, so he does not do as well here as one would expect. Judging from the result, he should have played 109 at *a*.

Figure 5 (116-151). *White takes the lead.*

White 16 is a clever move. Answer-at 1 in *Dia. 13* takes the most points in the corner, but then White makes a sharp attack with 2 and 4. Black





Figure 5 (116-151)




Dia. 13

collapses after the sequence to 14. Black has to let White set up the squeeze from 18 to 24, but this is an excellent result for White.

White 26. The largest endgame move. White is now certain of victory. If Black answers at 36, White *a*, Black 34 follow, then White switches to 28 and 30, as in the game, and threatens both White *b* and White 33.

Black 27 aims at reducing White's territory, while also protecting the weak point at *b*. However, Black cannot omit 29 after White 28. If he plays 29 at 1 in *Dia. 14*, White sets up a ko. If Black 5 at *a*, White makes a two-step hane at *b*. In the end, Black is forced to connect in gote by playing on a dame point at 33. Capturing a stone with 34 and 36 settles the issue.



Dia. 14

The sente squeeze with 38 to 50 is an excellent endgame sequence.




Figure 6 (152-190)

Figure 6 (152-190)

White 52-56. These moves are bigger than they appear as White threatens to push in at *a* and *b* later.

Takemiya resigned after White 190. The game is very close on the board, so he is behind by the komi. Once again, Takemiya had faltered in the late middle game. Somehow, his inconsistent play in this game gave one the impression that he had not yet recovered from the shock of losing the third game.

(Time used: Black: 7 hours 9 minutes
White: 6 hours 6 mins.)

(From a commentary by Kato in the August *Kido*)

Game Five

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kato Masao

Date: 29th, 30th June, 1977





Figure 1 (1-34)


Figure 1 (1-34)

White 6. In the first and third games, Takemiya made the small knight enclosure, but this time he tries something different.

White 10. If White answers 9 at *a*, Black plays either 14 or *b* and one has the feeling that he has seized the



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


initiative. If White plays 10 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, however, Black takes sente with 2 and 4, then occupies the nice point of 6, which is better than *a* in this fuseki. This is why White exchanges 10 for 11 before approaching at 12. Black of course answers with 13 and 15—1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* are too mild, as they let White settle himself comfortably with 2 and 4.

White 16. Takemiya played at *c* in the first Gosei title game, but Kato's attack at *d* worked excellently. The move at 16 gives Black no good continuation here, so he switches to 17.

Blocking at 22 is only common sense. The sequence in *Dia. 3* would be welcomed by Black, as the effectiveness of White $\triangle$ is greatly decreased.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

White 28 is a well-timed cut which promises White various sente moves later. However, Black cannot play 27 at 1 in *Dia. 4*, as Black $\triangle$ becomes over-concentrated after the White 2-Black 3 exchange.

Black 31, 33. Black has little choice but to play these moves because of his shortage of liberties here.

White 34 is a very thick move which epitomizes the Takemiya style. White 1 in *Dia. 5* also seems possible. Black answers by attacking at the vital point of 2, after which the moves to 10 seem likely.



Dia. 5





Figure 2 (35-46)

Figure 2 (35-46)


After 34, doing something about White's moyo is imperative. Black 35 is a probing move, but it has an additional function which is explained

later.

Takemiya was surprised by Black 35 and 37. He had expected Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*, after which he planned to play at 4. The continuation to 10 is one possibility the players looked at




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

after the game. Kato had doubts about 9 in this sequence and suggested 9 in *Dia. 7* instead. It is very difficult to evaluate the relative merits of sequences such as these, especially at such an early stage of the game, but these diagrams do give one some idea of the kind of analysis involved in top-level Go.

White 38. This is a crucial move and the players spent a lot of time analys-



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


ing it in the post-game discussion. The main alternative they were concerned with was White 2 in *Dia. 8*. To take the simplest problem first, the meaning of Black 35 was to prevent Black from getting a ladder with 6 when he answers 1 with 2 and 4. Black  (35) acts as a ladder-block. White must therefore play at 6 in *Dia. 9*, but this means that Black 5 retains considerable nuisance value.

Dia. 9. First of all, the players laid out the sequence to 12 here, but Kato commented that he was unhappy with Black 7, as he felt that White came out better in this result.

Dia. 10. Kato suggested pushing up



Dia. 10




Dia. 11


at 7, followed by a diversionary attack with 9 and 11. However, this seems to work out badly when White counters with 12, so —

Dia. 11. The conclusion was that the combination of 7 and 9 here is best. This would give a reasonable game.

The remaining possibility for 38 is 1 in *Dia. 12*, but this can quickly be dismissed, as Black settles himself too easily with 2 and 4.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13


Black 41. Kato had doubts about this move, as White builds forbidding thickness with 42 to 46, while Black has to crawl ignominiously along the second line. He wondered about 1 and




Kudo 9-dan joins in the post-game analysis.

3 in *Dia. 13*. Takemiya commented that in that case he would consider the sequence White *a*, Black *b*, White *c*, Black *d*, White *e*. Alternatively, he could keep White *a* in reserve and instead force with 4 at the top. Black 5 in response makes correct shape, but White can still force with 6 and 8. (This is one of the side-benefits of the thick move of 34 in Figure 1). White would probably continue then by invading at 10. If White plays 14 at *f*, Black plays at *g*, thus making things tough for White's three stones at the top right.

White 44. If at 1 in *Dia. 14*, Black cuts once at 2, then gets life easily with 4 and 6. White *a* is not even sente.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

White 46. Takemiya considered enclosing at 1 in *Dia. 15*, but Black gets quite a few points on the side with the sequence to 14.





Figure 3 (47-53)

Figure 3 (47-53)

Black 47. This is a very difficult point of the game for Kato. He has to choose between invading White's moyo with 47 or simply making the game a competition in surrounding territory with moves such as 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*.




Dia. 16

Kato: 'Black 47 may have made the game difficult for me. Perhaps I should have played something like 1 in *Dia. 17*.'

Takemiya: 'If Black 1 and 3, White feels like counterattacking with 4.'

Kato and Takemiya are both very zealous at post-game analysis and sometimes it seems more as if they are starting a new game altogether. In this case, the two of them and Kudo 9-dan, the official commentator on



Dia. 17

the game, worked out the continuation to 29 and agreed that it would give a close game.

White 48 in answer to 47 makes good shape. The continuation to 52 is natural. After 52, Black must defend at 53. If he plays at *a*, for example, White can make a severe invasion at *b*.




Figure 4 (54-78)

Figure 4 (54-78)


White 54. Takemiya regretted this move. He should first have played at 55, driving Black's group towards the centre. Takemiya thought that he could play 54 in sente, then switch to

55. However, Kato quickwittedly seized the opportunity to play at 55 himself.

Black must answer 56 at 57, as an invasion by White at *a* would be very severe. White 56 is also a big move in itself, apart from being sente.

White 60 and 62 are the kind of *ajikeshi* (potential erasing) moves that one is usually reluctant to play, as they help Black to strengthen his group, but White has no choice. His aim is to strengthen himself here before making an all-out attack on Black's centre group. White is behind in territory, so he has to use this attack to take extra profit.

Black 63. If Black ignores 62, White can play 1 to 15 in *Dia. 18*.



Dia. 18

Black 65. If Black simply answers 64 at *b*, he is left with a weak point at *c*, where White can aim at wedging in later.


White 70 was the sealed move at the end of the first day.

Black 73 is a vital point. If Black permits White to play here, White *d* is then sente, preventing Black from playing the sequence from 87 in the next Figure.

The gravity of the position is shown by the slowness of the play at this point. Takemiya spent 86 minutes on the sealed move, then one hour on 78,

while Kato took an hour over 77.

White 78. If White pushes through and cuts with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 19*, Black gets a half-eye (i.e. an eye in gote) with 4 to 8, then plays 10. Since he can capture the white stone with *a*, he should be able to get two eyes.




Dia. 19


The consensus of opinion among the professionals following the game was that Black had a 70% chance of living. Apparently, however, Kato was not worried about the possibility of his group dying. His main concern was that he would lose if he lived clumsily, that is, if he let White gain too much profit from his attack.

Figure 5 (79–100)

Black 79 guards against White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 20*, as Black can get a ladder.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

White 86. White cannot cut directly with 1 in *Dia. 21*. Black 2 in sente, so Black catches White with 4 to 8.






Figure 5 (79-100)

Black 87 and 89 are a sharp combination. If White plays 4 in *Dia. 22*, Black counters with 5 etc. White could capture the stones at the top, but permitting Black to break through at the bottom is bad.



Dia. 22
6 : connects

White 94. Takemiya regretted this move very much—it was perhaps the move that gave Kato the Honinbo title. There might have been a different result if White had forced with 1 in *Dia. 23* before cutting at 3. In the continuation here, worked out by Honda 9-dan, Black gets two eyes, but at the expense of having his left side group thrown into ko. Black might therefore



Dia. 23

play 8 at *a*, followed by White *b*, Black *c*, White 14, Black 17, White *d*, Black *e*. Black thus tries to set up a capturing race, but the weakness of Black's group at the top (White has the threat of *f*) means that White should easily be able to live. The possibilities in this position are endless, but whatever happens, Black seems to be in trouble once White plays 1.





Figure 6 (101-150)

Figure 6 (101-150)

After Black 101, it seems to be impossible to capture Black's centre


group. Moreover, Takemiya had used up all his time and went into byo-yomi of a minute a move with 102. Kato still had over three hours left. White could attack at 1 in *Dia. 24*, but Black can save himself with the sequence to 18.



Dia. 24

White 6. Another move much regretted by Takemiya. This should be the hane at 33.

Black 15. Kato finally lived with this move, but surprisingly he commented later that he felt that he was behind at this stage. In Kato's opinion, White missed a valuable opportunity



Dia. 25

with 18. If he had played the sequence from 1 to 11 in *Dia. 25*, White would have been sure to win.

White 32. According to Kato, Take-

miya missed his last chance to win with this move. White should have played at *a* first, forcing Black *b*, then switched to 32. Black 33 secured the game for Kato.





Figure 7 (151-209)



Dia. 26

Figure 7 (151-209)

White 56. White cannot intercept at 1 in *Dia. 26* because of the sequence to 10.


Takemiya finally resigned at 8.14 p.m. after Black 209—he seemed to be nine points behind on the board. Kato Masao thus became the 9th Honinbo. The one-sided score of 4-1 might give the impression that Kato had it easy, but as this game shows, he had to fight every inch of the way.

(Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 mins.

Black: 7 hours 32 mins.)


GOOD AND BAD STYLE

Problem: Black to play




13


Vulgar style




If Black plays 1 and 3, he ends up losing the stone at 1.




14




Black 1 in reply to the hane  loses points.




15



Black 1 loses points in sente. White a and Black b follow later.




16




If Black plays 1, he has to take the white stones off the board.


Correct style




The placement at 1 is correct style.




White is forced to answer with 2 to 6, so Black gains two points.




Black should answer by making an eye.




After 3, the white stones are captured. This is clearly a gain for Black.




Black 1 is correct style.



This way White's area decreases by 2 points. If White 4 at 5, Black starts a ko with 4.



Capturing with 1 is correct style.




Black does not have to take the white stones off the board, so he clearly makes more profit.


IS IT A LADDER?

When one side discovers along the way that he has been misreading a fight in a local situation, he can usually take steps to minimize the damage or to patch up his position. Not so with a ladder—each stone one plays in an unfavourable ladder is a hideous and irretrievable loss. Often one has to resign there and then.


Training oneself to read ladders from the very first move is therefore essential. The following problems are offered as practice. Needless to say, you should try to solve them without playing out the moves on a board.




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3



Problem 4



Problem 5



Problem 6

Answers on page 45

MATCH THE JOSEKI TO THE FUSEKI


by

Sekiyama Toshio 9-dan


In this series we analyse one popular joseki in each instalment and examine the kind of fuseki in which it is most appropriate. Emphasizing rote memorization of joseki is a bad approach—joseki must always be considered as an integral part of the overall position. It is our hope to help clarify the relationship between joseki and fuseki.

In each of these three positions, all taken from four-stone handicap games, Black has just played the attach-and-extend joseki with 1 and 3. However, this joseki only fits one of the three positions—the other two are fakes. That is to say, in two of the positions, Black 1 and 3 are bad moves.


Which is the genuine position?




Position B



Position A



THE CORRECT FUSEKI



The genuine fuseki: Position C


The attach-and-extend joseki is analysed at length in Volume 3 of Ishida Yoshio's "Dictionary of Basic Joseki", so in the discussion below, we concentrate mainly on the relationship between this joseki and the overall position.

The advantage of Black 1 and 3 is that these moves work in conjunction with to build up a moyo for Black.


The disadvantage from White's point of view is that after the sequence to 5, White turns out to be badly located. Black can aim at taking advantage of this defect in White's position.

Dia. 1. Black's aim is the sacrifice tactic of cutting at 1. Preceding this move with the exchange of for probably makes it all the more effective.


Dia. 2. If is one line lower, it is possible for White to answer patiently



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


with 2 and 4.

Dia. 3. However, this is not possible when is on the star-point, as Black 5 is very bad for White.


Dia. 4. For this reason, White must capture with 2 and 4.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5. Black forces with 5, then hanes at 7.

Dia. 6. Black 9 is also sente.


Dia. 7. This shape is the final result.



Dia. 7

White is awfully over-concentrated and his stones are working very inefficiently. White , in particular, has become completely superfluous. Black, on the other hand, has built up such impressive thickness that it is no exaggeration to say that he is heading for an easy win.

Dia. 8. With this kind of position on the left, cutting at 1 only helps White to




Dia. 8

strengthen himself. This time White gets a good result, with no inefficient stones.


The above is a good example of how the same sequence can be either good or bad, depending on the overall position.

This is a small point, but the order of moves with Black 7 in Dia. 5 is important.

Dia. 9. If Black plays 7 here first, there is a danger that White may switch elsewhere.




Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 10. When Black later captures with 1, White can force with 2.


Dia. 11. However, when Black has made the hane at , he captures with 1 when White ignores him. This time White *a* is not sente—on the contrary, the hane at *b* is Black's privilege. In other words, the hane at  makes it difficult for White to dispense with answering.




Dia. 11

Dia. 12. To sum up, when Black plays 1 and 3, White  ends up in an awkward position and Black can look forward to making the cut at *a*.

Dia. 13. For the above reasons, White



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

6 is the proper move after Black 5. This sturdy move defends the cutting point at *a*, but all the same White is dissatisfied because of the narrowness of the gap between 6 and .

The ordinary continuation of 7 to 11 is good enough for Black—the game is clearly going well for him. If White later pushes through at *b*, Black gives way at *c*, The sequence White *d*, Black *e*, White *f*, Black *g* is quite adequate for Black. Once White has defended against the cut at *a*, answering White *b* with Black *d* is risky for Black.

Instead of 4—


Dia. 14. White may invade at the 3-3 point with 1. Black 2 to 8 is a handicap Go joseki, which is to say that it actually involves a slight loss for Black. However, Black plays next at




Dia. 14

10 (or around *a*), giving him an adequate result in the context of the overall position. White has concentrated too much on the top of the board, while Black has a vast moyo and a straightforward position.

Dia. 15. Black 2 is more severe than the answer in *Dia. 14*.




Dia. 15




Dia. 16

Dia. 16. If White connects at 3, Black gets a favourable result with 4 to 8.

Dia. 17. White therefore switches to 3 and Black cuts at 4.




Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Dia. 18. The combination of 4 and 6 is an alternative to cutting at *a*.


Dia. 19. If 7, Black forces with 8, then attacks at 10. The sequence in *Dia. 14* is satisfactory, but this severe ap-




Dia. 19

proach might be adopted by a player who is fond of fighting.

Dia. 20. What about White 3?




Dia. 20




Dia. 21

Dia. 21. If Black still cuts at 4, White extends to 5. This result is not good enough for Black.

Dia. 22. Black 4 and 6 are no good either. This result is little different to *Dia. 21*.




Dia. 22



Dia. 23


Dia. 23. The two-step hane does not work well either, since White has the ironical move of 7. Black is being outplayed whatever he does.

Dia. 24. Blocking White's path with 4 is a good move. If next White *a*, then Black *b*. This is painful for White, which is why 3 in *Dia. 17* is the joseki move.



Dia. 24

THE FAKE FUSEKI I: POSITION A



Position A


Black 1 and 3 are very bad moves in this position. White already has △ lying in wait on the right side, so building up one's strength here is meaningless. If White just plays the usual continuation of 4 and 6, Black has to defend around 7. White gets sente and so seizes the initiative. In this position White wants to play at the top anyway, so he is grateful when Black helps him with 1 and 2 and on

top of it gives him sente.

Dia. 1. Something like the high two-space pincer at 1 feels right here. If White 2, Black defends solidly with 3. If White 2 at *a*, Black of course intercepts at *b*.

The important point to note here is that Black 1 works in conjunction with the △ stones to build a moyo. The top is the key area for both sides, so Black must play there before White.


THE FAKE FUSEKI II: POSITION B




Position B

Playing Black 1 and 3 in this position goes against the logic of Go. These stones have little future potential. First of all, the presence of White △ means that Black's position is open at the side. Secondly, White ⊙ inhibits Black in the centre.

If Black answers 6 by making correct shape with 7, White will probably slip under at 8. Sealing White in next with Black *a* is not very effective because of White ⊙. At any rate, letting White secure his base with 4 and 6 makes the position easy for him.



Dia 1: correcting the fuseki



Dia. 1: correcting the fuseki

Dia. 1. Black 1 may not be the best move, but it is good enough in a four-stone game. If White invades at 2, Black plays the sequence to 13. This makes effective use of the  stones on the left. If White plays 2 at *a*, Black answers at 11 and gets a far superior position to that in Position B.

Black 1 is a solid move. If you want to play more severely, we recommend Black 1 at 7.

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
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
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IS IT A LADDER? ANSWERS




Problem 1: YES

One must not give up around 14—16 is the decisive blow.




Problem 2: NO

The position resembles that in Problem 1, but this time it is Black who meets with disaster.




Problem 3: YES

White's group looks as solid as a rock, but the solitary black stone inside it undermines his whole position.



Problem 4: YES


Misfortunes never come singly—trying to escape from the ladder leads to the destruction of White's side group as well.



Problem 5: NO

23: connects (right of 21)

After some desperate twisting and turning, White escapes from his pursuer. Black: if only I had a stone at *a* . . .



Problem 6: YES


21, 25: connect

White may think that he is safe, but the throw-in at 22 wipes the smile off his face.

NEW JOSEKI


*Recent professional innovations in joseki
selected and reported on by*

Abe Yoshiteru, 8-dan




Dia. 1

My choice for August was White's extra-large knight's move in *Dia. 1* (White 6 in the game figure), a new reply to the two-space high pincer. It is a development from the large knight's move in *Dia. 2*, which has hitherto been the most common reply to this pincer.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

To review the other standard variations, White's one-space jump to *a* in *Dia. 2* is common too, especially in handicap games, since it is comparatively simple. The two-space jump to *b* is also played. White *c*, however, which is thought to cause White a loss, is a rarity.

The attachment at 1 in *Dia. 3* is sometimes played, as are White *a*, *b*, and *c*, but definitive variations starting from these moves have yet to appear.


That was the situation when Kudo played 6 in the game below, and here is what he and some others had to say about it.



Game Figure (1-41). Oza elimination rounds


White: Kudo, 9-dan. Black: Honda, 9-dan

Kudo: 'I didn't think I came out badly through Black 35, but during the game I was worried that Black might extend at 1 in *Dia. 4* instead of giving atari at 19. The result would seem to be the ko through Black 23.



Dia. 4


19 connects




Dia. 5

‘If Black had answered White 1 with 2 in *Dia. 5* I was planning to make the contact play at 3. If Black wedges in at 4, then White 5 to 9 look good, since the ladder is favorable, although there are other variations too.

‘If Black plays the knight’s move at 2 in *Dia. 6*, White 3 to 7 give about a fifty-fifty result.’




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Honda: ‘Instead of cutting at Black 13 in the game, I considered playing Black 1 in *Dia. 7*, but I’m not sure if the result through Black 11 is very good, even though there’s Black *a* to aim for.’

Fujisawa Shuko: ‘My reaction to the variation through 35 in the figure is that it favors White. Eventually he will play $\odot$ in *Dia. 8* and force Black to capture the five $\triangle$ ’s. If we disentangle the position by also removing the five black $\triangle$ ’s, the verdict is “not bad for White”.’



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Otake: ‘To return to White 6 in *Dia. 4*, if White shifts this to 1 in *Dia. 9* he gets the result through 19. Black loses the corner, but he has a lot of ko

threats left in it so he still seems to come out ahead.’


Kudo: ‘White could play 3 in *Dia. 9* at 12 and make two eyes.’

Otake: ‘Yes, but that gives *Dia. 10*. Black lives with four points of territory, so it’s bad for White.’



Dia. 10

Otake: ‘Let’s go back to the very beginning and see what happens if Black ignores White’s move, as in *Dia. 11*. But then 3 seems to give White superior power on the board. The exchange of Black $\triangle$ for White 1 becomes good for White. Anyway, the result in the actual game favored White, since he got to take the empty corner with 36.’




Dia. 11

Obviously, research on this new move has just begun, and I have no conclusion to offer yet. The reader might enjoy experimenting on his own.

(Translated by James Davies)

ORIGINAL HANDICAP STRATEGY

Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan




Basic Figure


Basic Figure. When forced to take a nine-stone handicap, try answering White's opening kakari at 1 by attaching at 2 and blocking at 4 to harden the corner. The handicap does not have to be exactly nine stones for this strategy to work well; it is effective over a broad range of handicaps.

If White continues from the basic figure by connecting at 7 in *Dia. 1*, Black has a nice tesuji at 8. White cannot improve on 9, and 12 completes Black's shape. White now has no way to invade the lower left corner. If he tries 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, for example, Black 4 kills him. In addition, if he ignores Black 12 in *Dia. 1*, Black *a* is a powerful attack.


The point of all this is that there is no looseness left in Black's position for White to exploit. Solidifying the shapes as you play along is good strategy in handicap go. Compare



Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3, where Black makes the ordinary response at 1. White has room left to enter at *a*, *b*, *c* etc. and Black is not so well off.

Another joseki has Black following his attachment by extending to 3 in *Dia. 4*, but this leaves White many counter-moves—*a*, *b*, *c*, etc. Especially at nine stones, it is best to leave White as few openings as possible.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

If White changes 9 in Dia. 1 to 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black naturally cuts and captures $\triangle$ with 2. If White ignores 2, next Black *a*, combining territorial acquisition with attack, is a good point.

If White changes 7 in Dia. 1 to 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black cuts at 2. Mutual extensions at 3 and 4 follow, and now if White escapes with 5 Black defends at 6, leaving White split apart and weak. If White plays 5 at 6, Black *a* captures his left-side group. Even at nine stones, there are limits to what White can get away with.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


Black may have a stronger option at 4 in Dia. 6. He can perhaps play 1 in *Dia. 7*. Ordinarily he would then lose his cutting stone in a ladder (White *a*), but here the ladder does not work; White will be hard put to find a way out of this predicament.

If White chooses not to fight with 3 in Dia. 6 and goes for safety with 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black should not resist him. Securing a large area with 2 and 4 is more than satisfactory.

For that matter, Black doesn't have to cut at 2 in Dia. 6, or *a* in *Dia. 9*. Just



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

defending at 1 is good enough. White cannot invade at the three-three point, and if he does nothing, Black *b* is threatening and strong.


Another set of variations starts with White 1 in *Dia. 10*. Cutting at 2 is one way to answer. Black 4 becomes very effective; if White hanes at 5, Black cuts at 6. The result through 10 is dreadful for White, but if he plays 9 at 10 and lets Black play 9, the left side dies. Perhaps White 3 should be at 4, but then Black *a*, White 3, Black *b* still give Black plenty of strength in the center.

Nor is it bad for Black to answer White's descent at $\triangle$ with 1 in *Dia. 11*. After 3, Black *a* looms very large.


Black must also be prepared for White's wedge at 1 in *Dia. 12* (instead




Dia. 10




Dia. 11




Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

of the hane at *a*). His best counter is to give up the corner (no loss, since White could have invaded at the three-three point anyway) and build outside power through 12. If then White *a*, Black *b* etc. through Black *j*, the corner returns to him. Whatever happens, he cannot come out badly.

If Black answers White's wedge by giving atari from underneath with 1 in *Dia. 13*, White 2 to Black 7 is the con-

tinuation, but this way is riskier for him.

Dias. 14 and 15 show two other approaches that White may use in nine-stone games. Black's strategy of attach and block is still applicable.

In handicap go it should be an iron rule not to pick unnecessary fights, but to play solidly and leave White no openings to take advantage of.

(Translated by James Davies)

THE X-Y-Z AFFAIR

Cast

Xan amateur 2-dan
Yan amateur 3-dan
Zan amateur 1-kyu
W.....an amateur 5-dan
Miyamoto Yoshihisaa professional 9-dan
Ndirector of the public hall at the Kansai Ki-in

Scene

The Kansai Ki-in in Osaka, where every month the members of the X-Y-Z Club meet to lay the work of two hapless amateurs on the dissecting table.

W. Well, what do we have this month?

Y. I put N to the trouble of recording a game between two of the regulars at the Ki-in. Who were they, N?

N. Both the weak and the strong show up in great numbers at the Ki-in, but among them the 1- and 2-dans have a reputation for slightly overrating them-

selves.

Y. Not a very welcome reputation, is it?

X. Don't look at me.

N. The 2-dans are considered the worst offenders, so they've formed a study group to try to raise their level.

Y. A good idea.

N. They meet on the third Sunday of

each month and go at it with a will.

Z. Can you give us more details? How many people belong?

N. About twenty, mostly company men or self-employed businessmen in their forties. They pay a thousand yen and have a four-round knockout tournament each month.

X. Can anyone join?

N. Yes, although I haven't noticed any stampede for membership recently.

Miyamoto. I've been looking at the game, N, and I see that you've picked a good one, as only you can. It's a real classic.

W. What about Black 5?

Miyamoto. It's a big point.

X. Black 7 and White 8 were both very restrained.

Miyamoto. White 8 was a little too restrained. I think a three-space extension to *a* would have been better. But then Black could invade later at *b*, so perhaps White 8 was all right.

Y. It's unusual for Black to play 9 high like that.

Miyamoto. Black *c* is more common.

W. Was there any reason why Black should play 9 high in this game?

Miyamoto. No special reason.

Y. In other words, playing low would have been better.

Miyamoto. At White 10, too—White 17 would have left Black open at the edge—but this isn't very important. White 10 was played in the right direction. Black's invasion at 11, however, came terribly early.

N. Probably a case of envy.

Miyamoto. If he had to invade, 14 was the key point, or Black 12 for a second choice. Either Black 14 or 12 was playable, but 11 and 13 were not.





Figure 1 (1-18)

Z. Why?


Miyamoto. Because if Black invades at 11 or 13 White can cross-cut, as in fact he did.

W. It was a pity for Black to extend to 15 and make White connect at 16.

Miyamoto. One's first inclination would be to play 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 1*, but that's bad because White can come out at 6.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Z. I thought you were going to say it was good.


Miyamoto. Let's try Black 1 in *Dia. 2*, but White 2 makes that bad also.

Z. What—again? Doesn't Black have anything good?

Miyamoto. No, because he invaded at the wrong point to begin with.

W. But suffering White 18 in answer to Black 17 was heartbreaking. Can't we do something here for poor Black?


Miyamoto. Well, perhaps Black 1 to 7 in *Dia. 3* would have been best. White 18 did put Black in a pinch. Y. Ouch!



Miyamoto. White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*, although not as severe as White 18 in the figure, were also possible. Once White plays 3, Black definitely can't tolerate a hane at *a*, so he plays 4 and White plays 5. The result is good for White.


W. White kept extending at 20, but I'm suspicious of that move.

Miyamoto. Offhand I'd suggest White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*. When Black met



White 20 with the cut at 21, White was suddenly in considerable danger. X. Let's see that danger set forth in a diagram.

Miyamoto. Black answered White 22 by giving atari at 23, but suppose he had just connected at 1 in *Dia. 6*. White 2 is forced, so Black hanes at 3. With 7, it's all over for White.



Z. Over almost before it started.
X. Can't White avoid this somehow?






Figure 2 (18-55)

Miyamoto. Not if he descends at 2, so perhaps he'll hane at 2 in *Dia. 7*. Then it isn't all over for him, but it's still pretty bad. Accordingly, he had to do something different with 26—jump to 28 for instance. Black 27 at 3 in *Dia. 6* would have captured him.



Z. Black lived with 29.
Miyamoto. He was playing too safely. He should have extended to 1 in *Dia. 8*.



W. Mightn't he lose his group on the lower side that way?
Miyamoto. Afraid? I'm not reading it out precisely, but—well, maybe he would lose it. That would be unfavor-

able, but he should have been willing to run the risk anyway.

Y. There goes Miyamoto bluffing his way through without reading.

W. Black got a dreadful result, being captured in the ladder at 32.

Miyamoto. Pretty unsightly.

X. How unsightly?

Miyamoto. Considering the way Black's original invasion at 11 turned out, any other move would have been better.

Y. I guess it would have been better to play Black 11 on the center handicap point, even.

Miyamoto. Center handicap point? Nuts, it would have been better to hold the stone a foot or so above the board, drop it, and play it wherever it rolled to a stop. Much better.

Y. Now that's the kind of comment that drives the point home.


N. Can't Black partake at 35?

Miyamoto. Bad—White drives out.


N. I see.

Z. Stop talking in code, please.

Miyamoto. *Dia. 9* is bad for Black.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

③ elsewhere

W. Was White 38 necessary?

Miyamoto. If White had forced Black at 1 in *Dia. 10*, he had nothing to fear. If Black 4, White lives with 5. This is the kind of place where you have to read carefully or you lose a whole move.

W. How about Black 39?


Miyamoto. My first impulse would be to play either Black *a* or 42. There's room for argument over which of these two moves is better, but all others are worse. I'd choose Black *a*, since White *b* would rob Black of his foundation.

Y. White 40 was cute.


Miyamoto. Cute, but wrong. White had to defend tightly at *c*. White 40 let Black ruin White's eye shape with 41.

W. White 42 was a good move.

Miyamoto. Yes, but Black 43 was a little overcautious. Black should have extended to *d*. White would then have been in trouble because of the ladder. White 44 should accordingly have been




Dia. 11




Dia. 12

1 in *Dia. 11*. Not the two-space extension in *Dia. 12*—that would invite Black 2 and 4. Going on, White should




Dia. 13



Dia. 14

have played 1 and so on in *Dia. 13* instead of 48, and White 50 and 52 shouldn't have been played at all. If Black  in *Dia. 14* were on the board it would be fine to sacrifice two stones like this, but in the actual game it gave Black too much thickness. Black, for his part, should have played 57 at *a* in *Figure 3*, and White 58 was too petty. White should have jumped out to 1 in *Dia. 15*. If Black struck at 2, White could just sacrifice a few stones in sente, then play another move on the outside at 9.



Dia. 15

Y. After that mouthful, the rest of us deserve a chance to speak.

Miyamoto. Go ahead, by all means.

X. Black 59 was a good move.

Miyamoto. Yes, and now White was in for it. If it were just the group on the right side he could have extricated himself somehow, but he had to worry about the ladder coming up from the lower side, too.

W. White 60 looks dangerous.

Miyamoto. Ordinarily White 60 would be all right, but as I keep saying, there was a ladder involved. White should have played 60 at 1 in *Dia. 16*.





Figure 3 (56-83)

Z. High-level strategy.

Miyamoto. Not so high-level, just related to the ladder. Suppose Black plays the ladder block at 2 in *Dia. 16*. White has to capture at 3, but the presence of White 1 makes it much easier for him to survive whatever comes next.



Dia. 16

Y. Black 61 and 63 were severe.


Miyamoto. White was stuck. He'd just have gotten into more trouble if he tried to escape with his three stones on the inside, so he sacrificed them, but that was no good either.

Z. No good? You're always telling us to 'sacrifice, sacrifice'.

Miyamoto. Sacrificing is fine, but you have to find the right way to do it.

Z. How, in this case?

Miyamoto. Capturing at 68 let Black cut at 69. White originally played 64 at the head of Black's two stones, but now Black's done the same to him with 69, while White 64 is in atari. He should therefore have played a double hane at *b* with 66, and again with 68. After 1 to 4 in *Dia. 17* he could proceed to 5—then he'd still be in contention.



Dia. 17

X. All this is very difficult.


Miyamoto. White brought it down upon himself by playing 60.

W. With 69, Black seems to have assumed the lead.

Miyamoto. Right, and now the fighting shifts back to the upper edge. Ordinarily White 74 would be at *c*, but—

Z. But what?

Miyamoto. But White probably played 74 and 76 to keep the game interesting,



Dia. 18


so I won't say anything.

W. What does White do if Black plays 77 at 1 in *Dia. 18*?

Miyamoto. Nothing—he's captured.


Y. Black must have wanted to keep the game interesting too.

Miyamoto. They both did their best. Now Black 83—that's the pearl of this game. If White had played 82 at 1 in



Dia. 19

Dia. 19, Black would have been in difficulties, but White was expecting *Dia. 20*, thinking to give himself an



Dia. 20

extra boost and make White 2 more effective.


Y. Great Caesar!

Miyamoto. White's idea was good, but this was the wrong occasion, since Black had that perfect tesuji at 83.

Y. Black 83 makes the whole game worthwhile.


(Translated by James Davies)

BLUEPRINT 361




Position 1

Position 1. White to play. Which of the three blueprints at right appeals to you?




A's Blueprint

A: White's center group is unstable, but offense is the best defense and he should attack at 1. White 5 after Black 4 is beautiful timing.



Position 2


Position 2. Black to play. The translator found this problem easier than the first.



A's Blueprint


A: Black should go for thickness in the center by attacking White's weak group with 1. After the diagonal play at 3, he can't lose.

Miyamoto Naoki, 9-dan




B's Blueprint

B: White 1 is the biggest extension on the board. Black 2 is the second biggest, but then White 3 enlarges the right side while protecting the group to the left.




C's Blueprint

C: Black should take the large point at 1, provoking White 2 and giving himself a chance to connect up at 3. Then he can attack in the center.



B's Blueprint


B: White 1 is the crucial point. Black will probably extend to 2, and White can be satisfied to do likewise at 3.



C's Blueprint


C: You're both wrong. Black should play the pincer at 1. Now there are three weak white groups on the board for him to divide and conquer.

Position 1. From a game between Honinbo Shuwa (white) and Yasui Sanchi. C's blueprint is correct.



Correct Answer

Correct answer: The group White is worried about in this position is the one in the left center. As long as Black can threaten it, White will be very restricted in his movements anywhere else. That makes White 1 the steadiest play, and if Black extends to 2, White follows suit at 3. Next he can invade at *a* or extend to *b*. If Black tries to defend the upper right with 6 and 8—




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. White probes by thrusting at 9. If Black, determined to defend his territory to the utmost, descends at 10, White wedges in at 11. Black has to connect at 14, and White gets the last large point at 15.

Dia. 2. If White does nothing about the center, Black will drive him against his wall with the contact play at 1 and extension at 3. White tries to make shape with 4 and 6, but Black 7 keeps the pressure on. Now if White extends to *a*, Black plays *b* and his upper side swells out to huge proportions.


Black 1 at 3, a capping attack, would also give White trouble.




Dia. 2

Dia. 3. A's blueprint was to attack with 1 and try to create a better opportunity to jump to 6, but he was taking too much for granted. Black will attach at 4, of course, and extend. It would be foolhardy of White not to answer Black 10 at 11, but then Black 12 makes it difficult for him to win.

Dia. 4. B's blueprint was to extend to 1. If Black *a* and White *b* then followed as he imagined, White's posi-




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

tion would be quite playable, but Black cannot be expected to make a lax move like *a*. Needless to say, it will be either the capping attack at 4 or, as shown, the contact play at 2 instead. By pressuring White through 9, then occupying *b*, he can build a large framework.


Reference Figure. Black 15 to White 24 are an old joseki. Black 49 was probably played to keep White from making the diagonal move at *a*. Shuwa missed nothing in White 62 through 76, and he won by resignation.




Reference Figure (1-78)

Position 2. From a game between Shuwa (white) and Jowa. A's blueprint is correct.

Correct answer. Of White's two weak groups in the lower half of the board, the one on the left has a somewhat elastic shape, but the one on the right offers a perfect target. Although Black concentrates on building up his own position in the center with 3 and 5, the pressure on White is unabated. All Black's groups are strong, and he should have smooth sailing ahead.




Correct Answer



Dia. 1


Dia. 1. To look at it from the other side, White's blueprint in this position would probably be to jump out with 1 and 3. Now he has the better center formation. Considering the presence of White $\triangle$ on the right side, Black 2 and 4 are not worth much, so Black is being forced. One purpose of Black's moves in the correct answer was to prevent this.

If Black plays 2 at *a*, White can safely respond at *b*.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. B's blueprint called for taking the large point at 1. This gives him some immediate profit, but no interest accrues later, and he lets White cancel his debt in the center. White begins by forcing Black with 2, settling his left-hand group. Next he skips out with 4 and 6, and now he has no unstable stones anywhere. Black, on the other hand, still has to defend at *a*.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. C painted a glowing picture of a three-way attack starting with Black 1, but White upsets everything by refusing to come out at 7. Instead he takes the crucial center point at 2, forces Black with 4, then makes a counter pincer at 6. Black 7 looks unavoidable, so White gets the last large point at 8. He now dominates the center, and White $\triangle$ takes much of the value out of Black's right side. Note also the potential for activity in the upper right corner, starting with White *a*. The game is not yet over, but White certainly has much more leeway than in the correct answer.

Reference Figure. Black 45 turned out to be a mistake. It triggered White 46, and Black ended up capturing only three stones with 55 while White made superb shape with 56. White won by resignation.

(Translated by James Davies)



Reference Figure (1-62)

PAGE FROM GO HISTORY

EAST vs. WEST

White: Hashimoto Uтарo 8-dan

Black: Yamabe Toshiro 5-dan
11th, 12th Feb., 1950 (no komi)

On the 13th September, 1950, the Kansai Ki-in, headed by the 5th Honinbo Hashimoto, seceded from the Nihon Ki-in. For some time dissatisfaction with the Nihon Ki-in, which was based in Tokyo, had been increasing among players of the Kansai (Osaka-Kyoto) area. The friction was mainly over administrative and financial matters, but the traditional rivalry between Tokyo in the east and Osaka in the west probably also played a part.

One manifestation of this rivalry was seen earlier in 1950 in a challenge to a team match issued by the Kansai players and sponsored by the Mainichi newspaper. The match was played at Nagoya, midway between Osaka and

Tokyo and was won by the Tokyo team with 7 wins to 5 losses. However, this was not a disgraceful result for Osaka. The luck of the draw matched Hashimoto against Yamabe, at 24 the youngest member of the Tokyo team, and their game proved to be the most spectacular.




Figure 1 (1-22)

Figure 1 (1–22). When Yamabe started with a move on tengen (the centre point), Hashimoto unhesitatingly replied with an approach move at 2. When Black continued with 3, White switched to the star-points at 4 and 6 in order to counter Black's centre influence.




Figure 2 (23–60)

Figure 2 (23–60). Black 39 is a bad mistake in direction—Black should block to the right of 23. Connecting up to his centre stones with 40 to 46 makes the game favourable for White.




Figure 3 (61–108)
ko : 107

Figure 3 (61–108). Black 69 is another slack move—making an approach at 108 is more urgent.




Figure 4 (109–164)

Figure 4 (109–164). White 24 and 26 are a nice combination—White scores a success in the sequence to 40. Black is unable to persist with the ko at the bottom and so is irretrievably behind. **Figure 5 (165–234).** Black resigns after White 234.




Figure 5 (165–234)
ko : 69, 72, 75, 80, 83, 86
88 : connects the ko

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Osterreichischer Go-Verband (Austrian Go Association), Menzelgasse 5, 1160 Vienna

ITALY

Minamoto-Associazione Italiano Gioco Go, 20125 Milano, Via. G. Braga 4

PADOVA: Go Club Padova, c/o Mr. Dario Colombero, via Newton 36, Padova.

DENMARK

Scandinavian Go Association, c/o Mr. Svend Eggers, Islands Brygge 29, I, DK-2300 Copenhagen S.

Nihon Ki-in Scandinavian Chapter, c/o Mr. Sen Suzuki, Vesterbrogade 12^{4th}, DK-1620 Copenhagen V. Tel. 213024

SWEDEN

Stockholm Go-Club, c/o Mr. Lars Yngveson, Blekingegatan 16, Stockholm. Tel. (08) 42-11-13

Club: S:t Paulsgatan 39A. Wed. 18.00-22.00.

Goteborg Go Club: Mr. Christer Lindstedt, Landlagangen 2, 411 30 Goteborg. Tel. (031) 188001, 163760

Club: Gotabergsgatan 17- Studentkaren. Wed. 18.30-23.30 (except in summer).

BELGIUM

ANTWERP: c/o Mr. Pauwel Schram, De Bosschaertstraat 143, 2020-Antwerpen

RUSSIA

LENINGRAD: c/o Mr. Astashkin V.A., USSR-Japan Society, Leningrad 191011, Fontanka 21

MOSCOW: c/o Mr. A.P. Tizik, Balashikha, Moskovskaya obl., P/O "Severnyi-1", Dom. 18, Ky. 305

HUNGARY

BUDAPEST: c/o Mr. Vekey Karoly, H-1113 Budapest, Bartok Bela u. 72

YUGOSLAVIA

LJUBLJANA: Go drustvo Ljubljana, c/o Mr. Oton Zagorc, Idrijska 11, 61000 Ljubljana

Go Zveza SR Slovenije, Ljubljana. Cankarjeva 1-1, PB 298 (Yugoslav Go Assoc. : President, Mr. Lovro Šturm).

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czech Go Association, c/o Dr. Dusan Prokop, Laubova 8, Praha 3

Go Club Tesla Karlin Praha, also c/o Dr. Prokop.

POLAND

WARSAW: contact Mr. Tsutomu Watanabe, c/o Toyo Menka Kaisha Ltd., ul. Szpitalna 1p. 40/42, 00-120 Warszawa. Tel. 26-81-11

JAPAN

Nihon Ki-in (Japan Go Association), 7-2 Gobancho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo. Tel. (03) 262-6161.

Kansai Ki-in, Nihon Bunka Kaikan Building, 7F, 3-41, Kitahama, Higashi-ku, Osaka. Tel. (06) 231-0186 /7.

KOREA

Hangook Ki-won (Korean Go Association), 13-4 Kwanchul Dong, Chongroku, Seoul (contact Mr. H. R. Lee)

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China Wei-chi Association, 2nd Floor F & G, Jin-ai Building, Jin-ai Road, 4th Section, Taipei.

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